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Bankruptcy Law. In re Kapsinow, 220 A.3d 1231 (R.I. 2019). A
bankruptcy debtor may claim certain state law exemptions under
Rhode Island General Laws section 9-26-4. The Court examined
section 9-26-4(11), drawing instruction from language in § 408 of
the Internal Revenue Code, to determine whether inherited Individual Retirement Annuities (IRA) from non-spouse may be exempted under state bankruptcy law. After analyzing the relevant
statutes, the Court found that the language of section 9-26-4(11)
exempts an inherited IRA from a non-spouse.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

On October 31, 2016, Lynette Kapsinow (Kapsinow), the
debtor, filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition.1 Stacy B. Ferrara
(Ferrara) presided over the matter as the trustee.2 Pursuant to
11 U.S.C. § 522(b) a debtor may choose state exemptions, which.
Kapsinow did.3 This option was available to Kapsinow because
Rhode Island has not opted out of the federal bankruptcy exemption
scheme; as such, a debtor has the choice between federal or state
exemptions.4 In Kapsinow’s bankruptcy petition, she attempted to
exempt an inherited IRA totaling $84,962.88, which was possessed
by American Century Investments.5
Kapsinow claimed the
exemption was valid under Rhode Island General Laws section
9-26-4(11).6 That statute lays out what “goods and property” shall
be exempted from “attachment on any warrant of distress or on any
other writ, original, mesne, or judicial.”7 In pertinent part, the
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statute exempts “an individual retirement account or individual retirement annuity as defined in the Internal Revenue Code, 26
U.S.C. § 408.”8 Ferrara objected to exemption of the inherited IRA.9
The IRA Kapsinow sought to exempt was inherited from her
deceased mother.10 When Kapsinow’s mother passed away, she
owned an IRA with Aviva Life and Annuity Company of which
Kapsinow was the beneficiary.11 The account was a “qualified retirement account” under § 408.12 Kapsinow completed an annuity
claim form for her mother’s IRA seeking to have the proceeds
transferred to an inherited IRA.13 Aviva Life complied with
Kapsinow’s request.14 The facts established that following her
mother’s death, Kapsinow had access to all of the funds in the
inherited IRA for any reason.15 Kapsinow could not contribute to
the inherited IRA and had to withdraw minimum distributions.16
Additionally, the IRA was required to be separate from any of
Kapsinow’s other accounts.17 The record showed that Kapsinow
abided by these requirements.18
On April 12, 2018, the Bankruptcy Court certified to the Rhode
Island Supreme Court the following issue: “Whether a debtor may
claim an exemption in an inherited Individual Retirement Annuity,
including one inherited from a non-spouse, pursuant to R.I. Gen.
Laws § 9-26-4(11).”19
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

A. Majority Opinion
Justice Robinson delivered the Court’s opinion. The Court
noted that questions of statutory construction are reviewed under
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a de novo standard.20 The Court began by laying out its methodology for questions of statutory construction: “if a statute is clear and
unambiguous we are bound to ascribe the plain and
ordinary
meaning of the words of the statute and our inquiry is at an end.”21
The Court asserted that only when a statute is
susceptible
to more than one meaning does the Court look to
determine
legislative intent as a method of statutory
construction.22 The Court added that it would not “construe a statute to
reach an absurd result.”23
The Court then analyzed the statute, which reads, in pertinent
part:
The following goods and property shall be exempt from
attachment on any warrant of distress or on any other writ,
original, mesne, or judicial:
....
(11) An individual retirement account or individual
retirement annuity as defined in the Internal Revenue
Code, 26 U.S.C. §§ 408 and 408A, and the payments or
distributions from such an account or annuity, except that
this exemption does not apply to any of the following:
(i) An order of a court pursuant to a judgment of divorce or
separate maintenance.
(ii) An order of a court concerning child support.
(iii) Contributions to an individual retirement account, or
premiums on an individual retirement annuity, including
the earnings or benefits from those contributions or
premiums that constitute an excess contribution within the
meaning of Section 4973 of the Internal Revenue Code, [26
U.S.C. § 4973].24
The Court held that section 9-26-4(11) unambiguously allowed
for the exemption of an IRA, if in accordance with § 408.25 Having
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found no ambiguities in section 9-26-4(11), the Court turned to
whether § 408 defined an inherited IRA.26
In analyzing §§ 408(a) and (b), the Court found definitions for
both “individual retirement account” and “individual retirement
annuity.”27 Additionally, § 408(d)(3)(C)(ii) provided guidance as to
when an “individual retirement account” or “individual retirement
annuity” should be characterized as “inherited.”28 The relevant
part of § 408(d)(3)(C)(ii) reads:
An individual retirement account or individual retirement
annuity shall be treated as inherited if—
(I) the individual for whose benefit the account or annuity
is maintained acquired such account by reason of the death
of another individual, and
(II) such individual was not the surviving spouse of such
other individual.29
The Court noted that § 408(d)(3)(C)(ii) applied to the rollover of
IRAs for tax purposes.30 As such, the Court next turned to
determining whether § 408(d)(3)(C)(ii) constituted a definition of
inherited IRAs.31
The Court concluded that § 408 was unambiguous.32 Moreover,
the Court asserted that § 408 clearly defined inherited IRAs under
§ 408(d)(3)(C)(ii).33 The Court reasoned that the General Assembly
sought to recognize an exemption for all IRAs defined within
§ 408.34 The Court pointed to the fact that the General Assembly
could have clearly restricted IRA exemptions to any specific
category found within § 408, but did not do so.35 The Court
elaborated that it was not its role to “determine whether a statute
enacted by the General Assembly ‘comports with [the Court’s] own
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ideas of justice, expediency or sound public policy.’”36 As such, the
Court was constrained by the statute before it.37 The Court went
on to summarize that since the language of the statute was clear
and unambiguous, it must only apply the plain meaning of the
words.38 The Court also noted that its interpretation did not lead
to an absurd result because other states had expressly exempted
inherited IRAs.39
In its analysis, the Court commented on a U.S. Supreme Court
case raised by the trustee, Clark v. Rameker.40 The Court noted
that in Clark, the U.S. Supreme Court held that under federal
bankruptcy statutes, “retirement funds” did not encompass
inherited IRAs.41 Here, the Court highlighted that Clark was
instructive of policy considerations, but not controlling, and
distinguished it from the present case—Clark dealt with a federal
statute containing the word “retirement funds,” while the present
case deals with different terminology found within a state statute.42
Moreover, state bankruptcy statutes may exceed the protections
found in federal bankruptcy statues.43 As such, the Court held that
under section 9-26-4(11), a bankruptcy debtor could exempt an
inherited IRA.44
B. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Indeglia delivered a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief
Justice Suttell, asserting that section 9-26-4(11) unambiguously
prevented a bankruptcy debtor from exempting an inherited IRA.45
The dissent deviated from the majority’s statutory construction
methodology, reasoning that the Court’s “ultimate goal is to give
effect to the purpose of the [statute] as intended by the
Legislature.”46 Justice Indeglia acknowledged that if the language
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of statute is clear and unambiguous, the Court “must interpret the
statute literally,” making sure to apply the ordinary meaning of the
words.47 He highlighted that each word or provision in a statute
has significant meaning; as such, the Court must give due
consideration to each word or provision.48
Justice Indeglia provided three reasons why the statute
unambiguously excluded inherited IRAs from exemption.49 First,
the statute never used the term “inherited.”50 Furthermore, the
only support found for the exemption applying to inherited IRAs
appeared in the Internal Revenue Code, § 408(d)(3)(C)(ii), which
deals with “tax treatment of distributions.”51 Second, the inherent
nature of inherited IRAs is far too dissimilar from IRAs.52 As such,
the Court should not implicitly add inherited IRAs to the language
of section 9-26-4(11).53
Lastly, Justice Indeglia reasoned that the policy considerations
supporting bankruptcy exemptions warranted the exclusion of
inherited IRAs.54 This conclusion was largely predicated on the
U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Clark.55 Justice Indeglia reasoned
that, although the terminology in the federal statute at issue in
Clark differed from the Rhode Island statute, both statutes referred
to § 408.56 Justice Indeglia concluded that the policy underlying
the decision in Clark to exclude inherited IRAs from exemption
should be followed in the present case.57 In Clark, the U.S.
Supreme Court reasoned that inherited IRAs did not make up the
debtor’s personal retirement.58 The Court in Clark rested its
decision on the policy consideration that bankruptcy exemptions of
this sort were only applicable to retirement funds.59 Furthermore,
the Clark Court asserted that the legislative intent behind
47.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1239–40.
Id. at 1239.
Id.
Id. at 1239–40 (citing Clark v. Rameker, 573 U.S. 122, 124 (2014)).
Id. at 1240 (citing Clark, 573 U.S. at 126.).
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bankruptcy exemptions is “to provide a debtor ‘with the basic
necessities of life’ so that she ‘will not be left destitute and a public
charge.’”60 Justice Indeglia concluded that, given the policy
considerations discussed in Clark, the purpose of bankruptcy
exemptions for retirement funds is to provide a “fresh start” for
debtors by protecting their retirement fund from creditors.61
Justice Indeglia closed his dissent by expressing concern that a contrary interpretation would result not in a “fresh start,” but rather,
a “windfall” to the debtor.62
COMMENTARY

This case illuminates the contrasting views of what the Court’s
role should be in deciding questions of statutory construction. The
majority rigidly grounded its opinion in the “clear and unambiguous” standard of statutory interpretation while the dissent
employed a more flexible approach, considering the policy behind
the statute. It is clear that the majority believed it gleaned enough
support for its conclusion in the plain meaning of the words found
within both the Rhode Island statute and federal bankruptcy
statute. The majority deferred consideration of Clark and the
policies underlying bankruptcy exemptions because under its
methodology, a clear and unambiguous statute requires no further
inquiry. The majority may have taken an overbroad approach in
concluding that the definition of inherited IRAs found in a provision
concerning rollover treatment of IRAs for tax purposes sufficiently
answered affirmatively that the General Assembly intended to
exempt all IRAs grounded in § 408. The majority’s approach
exhibits judicial restraint, and perhaps it is best for the Court to
refrain from treading into legislative policies when a plain meaning
can be gleaned from the statute. As the majority pointed out, the
General Assembly made no mention of restricting the exemption of
certain IRAs. Perhaps it is preferable to leave any sort of change to
the legislature, thus limiting the Court’s role to interpreting rather
than justifying.
On the other hand, the dissent persuasively argued that the
outcome from exempting inherited IRAs contradicted the purpose
60. Id. at 1239 (quoting Clark, 573 U.S. at 129 n.3).
61. Id. at 1240.
62. Id.
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of bankruptcy exemption statutes. The legislative intent behind
bankruptcy statutes proffered in Clark supports the dissent’s
conclusion. The danger of a windfall is surely evident when
allowing the exemption of an inherited IRA. Meanwhile, the
danger of a windfall is alleviated when a debtor is allowed to protect
his or her own personal retirement from creditors in order to
recover from bankruptcy.
Inevitably, discerning whether a correct outcome resulted is
predicated on what one views as the Court’s role.
Policy
considerations are instructive, and the Court should seek to
interpret a statute in a manner that the legislature intended.
Those who are elected to the legislature may enact any statutory
changes deemed necessary while the Court should serve its role as
an interpreter, not a drafter.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a bankruptcy
debtor may exempt an inherited IRA under section 9-26-4(11). The
Court held that the language of the relevant statutes clearly and
unambiguously supported this conclusion. As such, the Court
applied the plain meaning of the words within the statute, without
inquiry into policy considerations.
Drew E. Bartlett

